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Is the sky or the earth the limit? Risk, uncertainty and nature 
Abstract  
Dealing with uncertainty has become a matter of great concern for policy makers and 
scientific research in a world facing global, epochal and complex changes. But in essence, 
you cannot entirely predict the future. This article aims at conceptualizing the limits to 
anticipate the future – or what is often referred as the substitution of risk for uncertainty. 
In contrast to most theories examining risk and uncertainty, we start from the assumption 
that there are limits in the substitution of risk for uncertainty and that distinguishing 
between ontological and epistemic levels of analysis helps clarify such limits. The paper 
makes two arguments: first, most approaches see no ontological and/or epistemic limit in 
the substitution of risk for uncertainty; second, the pluralization of science is the only way 
to cope with limits in substituting risk for uncertainty. This second argument draws on the 
assumption that accounting for the uncertainty of the future depends on knowledge 
production processes able to overcome disciplinary boundaries and better include lay and 
expert knowledge. In times of great concerns regarding mitigation and adaptation to the 
ecological crisis, we illustrate our arguments with insights from global environmental 
governance. 
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Introduction 
‘The scariest part is that we do not know what is going to happen. Everything is possible (…) 
Our future is totally unknown. I feel like I do not have control over it’ (Massiot, 2019. 
‘Libération’, our translation). Such emphasis made by the climate activist Greta Thunberg in a 
French newspaper reflects the larger issue of how we anticipate the full range of uncertainties 
arising from the ecological crisis, including biodiversity loss, ecosystem services degradation, 
local and global tipping points, and climate change. The same concern bears upon finance, 
security, or health issues as illustrated by the dramatic experience of the Covid-19 pandemic. 
To this end, large tracks of scientists and organizations have developed complex knowledge 
infrastructures to calculate uncertainty and reduce it into a risk. The concept of risk indeed 
describes a phenomenon that can be objectified, anticipated, and ultimately managed with 
numbers, in which future outcomes have known probabilities. This contrasts starkly with 
uncertainty: the concept involves a situation in which information, knowledge, and calculation 
techniques are considered as insufficient to assess or measure the future. While the substitution 
of risk for uncertainty thus appears as highly valuable, a question remains: are there limits in 
substituting risk for uncertainty and, if so, how to cope with them?  
In the contemporary world, the prospect of reducing uncertainty and converting it into an 
objectified and quantified risk involves in one way or another the ability of states, markets and 
a flurry of non-state actors to shape the relation between economic and political spheres across 
borders. This is for instance how Blyth (2002) engages constructivist debates by emphasizing 
how agents’ behavior derives from the uncertainty shaping their ability to identify their interest. 
Ultimately, the conceptualization of risk and uncertainty determines how scholarship in 
international political economy is likely or not to anticipate future events (Blyth & Matthijs, 
2017). The few studies in international political economy specifically focused on the relationship 
between risk and uncertainty take a critical perspective on how the world is made ‘more certain, 
controllable, and governable’ (Deuchars, 2004, p. 2), as states, corporations and individuals all 
build on a common language of quantifiable risk in the context of globalization (Dannreuther & 
Lekhi, 2000). They focus on how the substitution of risk for uncertainty reflects a ‘strategisation 
of time’ (Lobo-Guerrero, 2014), depends on social conventions (Katzenstein & Nelson, 2013),  
and invents new institutions to ‘absorb uncertainty into manageable risk’ (Kessler, 2010, p. 119). 
With few exceptions, these studies see no limit in the conversion of uncertainty into risk. The 
same holds true for cognate fields of studies. In economics, a much greater number of prominent 
studies have examined the relation between markets, risk and uncertainty (Akerlof, 1970; Arrow, 
1963; Friedman & Savage, 1948; Gollier, 2018). While varying in many respects, they all see 
the future as subject to a well-defined and objectified analysis (Reddy, 1996, p. 230). They thus 
take their distance from the divide between risk and uncertainty that Keynes (1921) and Knight 
(1921) pioneered a century ago. For their part, studies in economic sociology precisely take as 
object of their critical enquiry such limitless practices of turning anything at hand into a risk 
likely to be accounted in market terms (Fourcade & Healy, 2013; MacKenzie, 2006; Muniesa et 
al., 2007).  
In contrast, this paper starts from the assumption that there are limits in the substitution 
of risk for uncertainty. In this context, distinguishing between ontological and epistemic levels 
of analysis helps clarify such limits. This distinction has already been made in one way or another 
in economic literature, in particular in post-Keynesian economics (Davidson, 1996) and in 
economics of conventions (Orléan, 1987). Moreover, as Dequech (2004, p. 375) points out, there 
is ‘strong entwinement of ontology and epistemology’ in this debate, as social reality and the 
production of knowledge remains entangled from a post-positivist perspective. Against this 
background, this paper sets out to analyze the limits in which risk can be substituted for 
uncertainty. The paper makes two arguments: first, most theories examining risk and uncertainty 
see no ontological and/or epistemic limit in the substitution of risk for uncertainty; second, the 
pluralization of science is the only way to cope with limits in substituting risk for uncertainty. 
The first argument is based on a critique of a large corpus of theories accounting for the future 
as a relation between risk and uncertainty.1 The second argument draws on the assumption that 
accounting for the future depends on knowledge production processes able to overcome 
disciplinary boundaries, and to better include lay and expert knowledge. In our view, 
international political economy literature would be well informed to consider such limits when 
analyzing the relation and substitution between risk and uncertainty. In times of great concerns 
regarding mitigation and adaptation to the ecological crisis, we illustrate our arguments with 
insights from global environmental governance and opposing responses to the relations between 
the economy, nature and society.  
This article first provides some background on the case we draw from to illustrate our 
argument before turning on the theoretical framework used for our analysis. The three following 
sections analyze theories on the relation between risk, uncertainty and the future in mainstream 
economics, heterodox international political economy and sociology, and evolutionary political 
economy; they set to probe our first argument regarding the absence of ontological and/or 
epistemic limit in the substitution of risk for uncertainty. The last section focuses on our second 
argument and explains how the pluralization of science provides a promising avenue for 
understanding intrinsic limits in the substitution of risk for uncertainty. We conclude by coming 
back on our arguments and further avenues for research. 
 
Risk, uncertainty and the ecological crisis: on the importance of limits  
While nature has long been viewed as the ‘ahistorical, stable and fixed stage of the changes 
triggered by humans and societies’ (Granjou, 2016, p. xi), the abrupt, complex and nonlinear 
changes related to the ecological crisis have shown that this is not the case. In 1982, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development published a report about economic 
and ecological interdependence that already identified uncertainty as the major challenge of an 
ever more tangible ecological crisis: ‘uncertainty prevents us from understanding the possible 
evolution of natural phenomena’ (OCDE, 1982, p. 9, our translation). Since the ecological crisis 
is no longer a future possibility but a present reality, discourses have now changed and often 
use the concept of risk instead of uncertainty. This understanding of risk is basically the one 
used in the Global Risk Report published each year by the World Economic Forum (2020, p. 
88). The insurance industry is another case in point. While insurers and actuary scientists are 
dealing with the impacts of the ecological crisis,2 their raison d’être is to transform these 
uncertainties into fungible risks on which standardized economic transactions and commodified 
exchanges can take place (Graz, 2019, pp. 117–122; Lobo-Guerrero, 2011, p. 11). Beyond the 
insurance industry, various risk and sustainable management techniques support the ability of 
capitalism to face the ecological crisis (Levy et al., 2016; Ponte, 2019; Sharma & Soederberg, 
2020).  
These interrelations between quantitative risk governance and uncertainties generated 
by the ecological crisis are far from new. The report Limits to Growth was already an attempt to 
map, calculate, and model the biophysical ‘future course of human society’ (Meadows, 1972, p. 
17). Similar anticipatory models drive the two largest global assessments ever made on the 
consequences of ecosystem change for human well-being: The Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment (2005) and the reports of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (see for instance its latest global report: IPBES, 2019). They 
both put great emphasis on economic methods and quantitative reasoning in the range of 
anticipatory techniques and responses worked out to face the ecological crisis. So-called 
‘ecological risks’ are illustrated by quantitative ‘biophysical thresholds’ or ‘planetary 
boundaries’ that could be exceeded depending on certain anticipatory scenarios and probabilities. 
These boundaries are defined by Rockström and his colleagues (2009) as ‘safe operating space 
for humanity with respect to the Earth system’ (p. 472), so that thresholds can be clearly defined 
with the help of numbers. 
A good case in point is the recent modelling of the future of the Greenland ice sheet 
through big data analysis made by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 
By putting ‘the best physics possible in there’ and building on ‘datasets that help drive models’, 
NASA scientists have transformed the uncertainty of ‘how greenhouse gases may impact 
Greenland and us in the future’ into a measurable and therefore manageable risk (NASA Goddard 
Space Flight Center, 2019). Scientists underline the yet unmanageable uncertainties arising from 
‘cascading dominos of feedback loops’, such as ‘the thawing and decomposition of carbon stored 
in permafrost [that] generates greenhouse gases’ (Vonk & Gustafsson, 2013, p. 675). Yet, they 
still have good hope in our future technological capacities and intellectual performances to 
transform such phenomenon into a set of measurable risks. As we will see below, such a belief in 
the progress of our knowledge and techniques is largely counterproductive and prevents a real 
understanding and acceptance of a situation marked by unknowable uncertainties – and thus the 
ability to provide credible responses. It also highlights much confusion between risk and 
uncertainty – two notions that remain too often ill-defined. In a world facing global, epochal and 
complex changes, this prompts us to conceptualize the distinction between risk and uncertainty, 
the limits in the substitution of one by another, and the nature of such limits. 
Drawing on Dequech (1999) and Reddy (1996), we understand uncertainty as a situation 
in which knowledge and information about a phenomenon is insufficient to allow our individual 
and collective cognitive capacities as well as our present calculation techniques to form any 
judgement or measure about the future. In this respect, a state of uncertainty can apply to our 
future technical and intellectual capacities to anticipate these uncertainties, so that we cannot 
simply rely on the hope of future progress. In contrast, risk refers to a phenomenon that can be 
objectified, anticipated, and ultimately managed with numbers, in which future outcomes have 
known probabilities. Against this background, the method used by policy makers and researchers 
for anticipating the future by substituting risk for uncertainty is a two-step process. First, it 
requires a classification of objects according to the available information and knowledge. Second, 
the calculation of probabilities. As Desrosières (2002) points out, ‘these two processes – defining 
classes of equivalences and encoding – constitute the essential stages of statistical work’ (p. 8). 
In other words, unknown events are first included into a frame of reference, and then probabilities 
and values related to their outcome are computed.  
While some theories examining risk and uncertainty recognize some limits in substituting 
risk for uncertainty, only few distinguish between their ontological and epistemic levels of 
analysis. As seen in the introduction, such distinction echoes previous analyses in Post-Keynesian 
economics (Davidson, 1996; Dequech, 2004) and economics of conventions (Orléan, 1987). We 
refer here to the epistemic dimension to explore the production of knowledge that is used to 
anticipate the future. An epistemic limit thus relates to an individual or collective inability to 
produce the required knowledge to turn an uncertain future phenomenon into a manageable risk. 
This is what Dequech (2004) appraises as the limits of ‘people’s mental abilities’ to anticipate the 
future (p. 368). At the ontological level of analysis, we focus on whether any kind of uncertain 
phenomenon that could occur in the future world can be assessed in such a way as to make it less 
‘truly uncertain’. As Dequech (2004) points out, uncertainty is not only a matter of knowledge, 
but can also be ‘caused by, or described as, some properties of reality’ (p. 368). In our view, an 
ontological limit of substituting risk for uncertainty would exist if a distinct class of objects are 
defined as unfit for quantifiable probabilities and expectations about the future. In such cases, the 
inability to turn uncertainty into a well-defined set of instances (or into a set of risks) is inferred 
from the nature of such and such real phenomena, rather than from the development of the apposite 
knowledge. It would be for instance the characteristics of complex ecosystems as such rather than 
modelling techniques that would put limits on risk management exercises related to biodiversity.  
The following sections use this theoretical framework to analyze how accounting for the 
future as a relation between risk and uncertainty is deemed to face such questions of limits. We 
will see differences at both the ontological and epistemic levels of analysis when it comes to 
ponder the limits in the substitution of risk for uncertainty. We will show that most theories 
examining risk and uncertainty do not set limits. Mainstream economics sees neither ontological 
nor epistemic limit in the substitution of risk for uncertainty. Heterodox international political 
economy and sociology adopts a critical stance regarding the tools and techniques of mainstream 
economics for uncertainty reduction. Yet, they see no ontological limit in the range of phenomena 
likely to be included by a society in order to substitute risk for uncertainty. We discuss a third 
school of thought as evolutionary political economy, in the wake of how Frank H. Knight (1921) 
analyses ontological limits in the substitution of risk for uncertainty. We will see that his analysis 
of expert judgement to anticipate the future is tantamount to a lack of epistemic limit in the 
substitution of risk for uncertainty. Finally, the pluralization of science appears as the only way 
to consider both ontological and epistemic limits in the substitution of risk for uncertainty, as it 
depends on knowledge production processes that overcome disciplinary boundaries and better 
include lay and expert knowledge. Table 1 provides a mapping of these approaches according to 
the theoretical framework presented above. Each cell visualizes whether each of these four 
approaches considers any limit in the attempt to substitute risk for uncertainty, and if so, whether 
it privileges an ontological and/or an epistemic understanding of such limits. 
 
 
Table 1.  The limits in the substitution of risk for uncertainty. 
 
    






Mainstream economics Evolutionary political economy 
Yes 
Heterodox international political 
economy and sociology 
Pluralization of science 
 
Mainstream economics: the sky as the limit 
We refer here to mainstream economics as a systematic approach in social sciences linked to 
fundamental convictions about how markets depend on individual utility maximization, i.e. the 
maximization of the satisfaction received from consuming a good or service.3 Mainstream 
economics sees neither ontological nor epistemic limit in the substitution of risk for uncertainty 
(see Table 1). It assigns to calculation techniques the power to break down such limits. In 
predicting future courses of human behavior on earth, mainstream economics aims at 
transforming an unknown event into a manageable risk thanks to an ‘extraordinary faith in 
quantitative techniques’ (Morgan, 1991, p. 1). Such forecasting exercise is made of a mix of 
expert knowledge and mathematical tools based on the assumption that ‘either this world is not 
complex, or it is inhabited by people with extremely powerful minds and/or computers’ 
(Dequech, 2004, p. 370, emphasis by the authors). In the wake of the 1913 Nobel Prize for 
Physics William Thomson (1899), mainstream economics often considers that ‘when you can 
measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about 
it; but when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory 
kind’ (p. 73-74). This also includes environmental economics literature developed since the 
1970s and the following green growth discourses in their attempt to transform any ecological 
future into a present economic cost or benefit (Nordhaus, 2015; Pearce et al., 2006). 
For mainstream economics, the measurement of utility is the core instrument to reduce 
uncertainty into numbers. As Moscati (2018, p. 1) points out, ‘over the course of the twentieth 
century, the concept of utility further expanded its reach and became the basis of attempts to 
analyze the economic decisions of individuals under uncertainty’. The development of the 
expected-utility theory has indeed aimed at explaining how individuals make rational choice in 
situation of uncertainty. It is based on the following motto: ‘choose the act with the highest 
expected utility’ (Briggs, 2017). While a large strand of expected-utility theory treats 
uncertainty as subject to an objective and probabilistic calculus of risk, other studies follow the 
subjective approach pioneered by Friedman and Savage (1948; see also: de Finetti, 1974; 
Savage, 1972). From this view, a probability is not about the frequency of an event in the real 
world. As Dequech (2011, p. 625) points out, it is about ‘a property of the way one thinks about 
the world’. Probabilities here derive from individual preferences. Be it subjective or objective, 
however, the risk is defined by a probability calculus that transforms uncertainty into a set of 
numbers. There is no ontological neither epistemic limit in the substitution of risk for 
uncertainty. And it is worth noting that such a way to calculate and anticipate policy preferences 
is not restricted to economics. It also feeds much debates in political science and environmental 
governance. The well-known ‘tragedy of the commons’ might indeed be solved by what 
Cashore and Bernstein (2019) call the ‘optimization school’, which treats ‘as objective the 
subjective belief that environmental issues matter more if they can be converted into economic 
[and thus quantitative] values’ (p. 11). 
These quantitative techniques do not come out of nowhere. They rely on expert 
knowledge. Mainstream economics developed various methods to identify the best knowledge 
likely to ponder collective expert judgements. This includes ‘triangulation strategies’ to 
combine different methodologies in the exploration of a single phenomenon (Denzin, 1978, p. 
291; Jick, 1979), the ‘Delphi method’ used to develop an opinion consensus from expert-driven 
questionnaires (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963, p. 458), or the ‘rational consensus’ developed by 
Cooke (1991, p. 81) to reach expert opinion in science. All these techniques build on 
mathematical procedures and models to weight experts judgement, such as ‘long records 
(statistics) of experts’ past performances’ (Boumans, 2015, p. 177). Here, mainstream 
economics focuses in particular on the absence of epistemic limit in the capacity of experts and 
their theories to produce the tools and techniques to anticipate the future. 
The same techniques are used by environmental economics, which also finds ways to 
reduce nature-based uncertainty by measuring it. Biodiversity, ecosystem services or 
greenhouse gases are all viewed as commensurable according to a price unit, what MacKenzie 
(2009) describes as ‘making things the same’. Since the pioneer study of Costanza and his 
colleagues (1997) that valued ecosystems at 33 trillions of US dollars of annual services to 
human beings, the growing importance of research on ecosystem services valuation led to the 
following leitmotiv in environmental studies: ‘we don’t protect what we don’t value’ (Myers & 
Reichert, 1997). This can be rephrased as ‘we don’t protect what we don’t economically know’. 
The various methods to value nature in monetary terms are inspired by utility-based models, 
such as the contingent valuation methods based on survey, in which individuals are asked about 
their preferences for environmental goods or services. As Skidelsky (2019) points out, these 
methods give economics ‘a unique predictive power, especially as the utilities can all be 
expressed and manipulated quantitatively’. They homogenize the heterogeneity of nature on a 
quantitative basis and reduce ecological uncertainty in setting economic values.  
The way mainstream economics conceives nature requires to put a value in the present 
on costs and benefits occurring in the future. In economic jargon, this is what discounting the 
future means. At the microeconomic level, this supposes setting a discount rate accounting for 
the degree to which we prefer present benefits (for instance money today) over future benefits 
(money in the future), what is commonly known as ‘revealed time preference’. At the 
macroeconomic level, the discount rate sets the same type of preference, yet at the level of a 
defined community (Baumstark, Hirtzman, and Lebègue 2005). Such uncertainty reduction in 
mainstream and environmental economics has been popularized since 2018 as William 
Nordhaus was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his work on 
calculations techniques to estimate how much the present generation should invest in limiting 
climate change (Nordhaus, 2015). These discounting models are however often wrong and 
contested (Hickel, 2018; Keen, 2020), and built on previous assumptions and beliefs. One of 
the most contentious issue is that environmental economists generally use a positive figure – 
and a pretty high positive figure for Nordhaus – in their valuation of the present with regard to 
the future.4 This deters investment to quickly reduce our environmental impacts, as its costs 
would be much higher today than in the future. 
In brief, mainstream economics sees neither ontological nor epistemic limit in the ability 
of probability calculus, expertise and mathematical modelling to substitute risk for uncertainty. 
As Reddy points out (1996, p. 230), this may even explain why mainstream economic scholars 
so often do not make any distinction between the terms risk and uncertainty – a remark which 
according to Blyth (2006) is also valid for political scientists who ‘routinely confuse risk and 
uncertainty’ (p. 495). While this drives most debates in environmental governance, other 
approaches identified as distant from mainstream economics are also at pain in considering 
limits in the substitution of risk for uncertainty, whether ontologically or epistemically.  
 
Heterodox international political economy and sociology: the how and the why of 
mastering the future  
We examine here heterodox approaches on risk and uncertainty in international political 
economy and sociology. While we are well aware that heterodox is a category encompassing 
many different traditions, we take here a broad understanding that goes back to early debates 
surrounding the development of the field of international political economy: heterodox scholars 
at least share a recognition of the subjectivity of social sciences in the wake of a post-positivist 
epistemology and of what Murphy and Tooze  (1991, p. 6) consider as the ‘variety of forms of 
historical and social explanations’ (see also the editorial of the first issue of RIPE: Amin et al., 
1994). Theories discussed here all question the lack of epistemic limits presumed by 
mainstream economics in substituting risk for uncertainty. Few of them, however, see 
ontological limits in the range of phenomena likely to be subject to questionable methods of 
uncertainty reduction (see Table 1).  
  Arguably, the most abstract way these studies understand how capitalism responds to 
an uncertain future is based on what Beckert (2016) calls ‘imagined futures’. Anderson (2010) 
also identified imagination as one among other practices of anticipation, in which ‘future 
events, states of affairs, or persons are imagined “as if” they were actual or real’ (p. 785).  
German social theory is probably the most forward-looking on the concept of risk from this 
perspective. While Beckert recently explored the impact of imagined futures on the dynamics 
of capitalism – what is called the ‘sociology of expectations’ –, Luhmann’s ‘system theory’ 
(1986) also includes significant developments on the construction of risks and threats. Social 
systems are viewed as having increasingly internalized complex external threats as risks to be 
dealt with systematically – this is what Luhmann (2013, p. 78) calls the ‘security of 
expectation’. However, complexity theory just as complexity reduction always produces 
another layer of uncertainty. Beck (1986) drew on Luhmann to develop his analysis of risk 
society, which in a way just deals with this puzzle. If science is no longer synonymous of 
security and progress, it keeps producing the problems it was supposed to solve. This also 
prompts a shift in authority from governments to researchers and global firms in charge of ever 
developing new tools and techniques to reduce uncertainty. Beck (2006) extended his argument 
to argue that risk has become the defining feature of late modernity, since ‘modern society has 
become a risk society in the sense that it is increasingly occupied with debating, preventing and 
managing risks that it itself has produced’ (p. 332). His definition of risk emphasizes the 
importance of time, reversing ‘the relationship of past, present and future’ (2000, p. 214). Thus, 
the present is based on the past to build future risks. However, it is worth nothing that Beck 
never really distinguishes between risk and uncertainty. Aradau and von Munster (2012) point 
out that Beck confuses risk and uncertainty, leaving the latter aside, since ‘uncertainty is merely 
the residual of risk, the incalculable leftover of risk management’ (p. 21).5  Like Luhmann, Beck 
thus sees epistemic, but no ontological limit in the substitution of risk for uncertainty as the 
production of another layer of uncertainty relies on previous substitutions of risk for 
uncertainty. Against this background, imagination, security of expectation or the embodiment 
of risk within society all allow to overcome the ontological limit in substituting risk for 
uncertainty. 
Another strand of scholarship adopts a lower level of abstraction by considering that 
imagination is embedded in the real world through social conventions. Orléan (1987) 
recognizes the radical uncertainty of economic and market relations, but still finds ways to 
anticipate the future thanks to social conventions such as mimetic behaviors: “when an 
individual has no criteria to discriminate between two opinions, rationality requires him to 
imitate a third party’ (p. 163; our translation). Similarly, Chiapello (2015) provides a critical 
analysis of the financialization of valuation as a specific form of calculation. Here again, she 
explains how such mechanism is made possible through ‘conventions used in order to pluralize 
the idea of economic quantification or monetary measurement’ (p. 14) Another good case in 
point regarding the anticipatory power of such conventions is provided by Nelson and 
Katzestein’s (2013) analysis of the 2008 financial crisis. In their view, finance lies in the world 
of uncertainty rather than risk, as economics, calculative practices and standards cannot foresee 
disasters. However, they argue that actors can still rely on social conventions to take their 
decisions, thus substituting risk for uncertainty. Katzenstein’s further research with Seybert 
(2018) suggests that such ability to face an uncertain future brings into play a ‘protean power’, 
which ‘results from the improvisations and innovations of agile actors and processes of the 
actualization of potentialities […] coping with uncertainty’ (p. 6). However, these conventions 
are not universal. They must be considered in their specific social context. It is worth to remind 
here Fourcade’s (2011) prominent study on claims to compensation from damages resulting 
from large oil spills in the United States and in Europe. She explains not just how ‘something 
that stands normally outside market exchange comes to be attributed an economic (monetary) 
value’ (p. 1723); she also shows how such monetization of nature significantly differs according 
to distinct sociocultural environments on both sides of the Atlantic. Ultimately, conventions 
brought into play by different kinds of actors all allow to overcome the ontological limit in 
substituting risk for uncertainty.  
Another strand of scholarship criticizing the lack of epistemic limits builds on Foucault 
to consider risk as a particular instrument of governmentality. It examines the performativity of 
discourses related to risk and the intrinsic dialectics between power and knowledge regarding 
the governance of the future. For instance, with a particular focus on the role of insurance as 
securing so-called ‘liberal forms of life’, Lobo-Guerrero (2014) emphasizes the importance of 
the ‘strategisation of time’, an abstraction process which ‘projects into a future the technological 
reality of the model fabricating the uncertainties of their own scheme’ (p. 366). From his point 
of view, knowledge on temporality allows for pushing ‘the limits of insurability’ (p. 356), and 
with it the limits of anticipation by the production of predictive models. In the same vein, 
Ericson and his colleagues (2003) see uncertainty as an object of governance insofar as ‘private 
insurance has come to constitute a vast behind-the-scenes system of informal governance’ (p. 
226). Many other scholars have written about risk as a technology of power and government to 
improve crime prevention (O’Malley, 1992, 2003, 2008), to settle down the welfare state 
(Ewald, 1986, 1996), to govern environmental (Gouldson & Bebbington, 2007) or terrorism 
risk (Aradau & van Munster, 2007), and eventually to manage everything (Power, 2004). From 
such Foucault-inspired approaches, all risks are likely to be governed and ultimately anticipated 
– so that there is no ontological limit in the substitution of risk for uncertainty.  
To sum up, similar analytical approaches are applied across many studies in heterodox 
international political economy and sociology to question the practices and underlying theories 
that assume no epistemic limit in the ability to reduce uncertainty in such a way as to make it 
an objectified, quantified and valuable risk. Few studies, however, see an ontological limit in 
the range of phenomena likely to be subject to such substitution of risk for uncertainty. To find 
such limit, we turn now to evolutionary political economy approaches. As we will see below, 
this will help us questioning the claim made by a large body of economic analysis to have the 
proper tools to transform any uncertain phenomenon into a set of quantitative risks. 
 
Evolutionary political economy: the power of Knightian expert judgement in the face of 
true uncertainty  
Evolutionary approaches presume that scientific knowledge aims at providing explanations on 
the origins, developments and transformations of individuals and institutions. They put great 
emphasis on processes and innovation, complex systems, and especially institutional dynamics 
(Dopfer, 2006; Hanappi & Scholz-Wäckerle, 2017). Two key thinkers stand out when it comes 
to dealing with the institutional dynamics that gears the political economy of uncertainty: John 
Maynard Keynes and Frank H. Knight. Both published in 1921 a book that will be celebrated 
for the next century.6 While Keynes’ Treatise on Probabilities (1921) explored the links 
between calculability and the production of knowledge, Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty and Profit 
(1921) forged new avenues for analyzing the relations between risk and uncertainty. Keynes 
conceives cases of ‘radical’ uncertainty and Knight of ‘true’ uncertainty. Both make a clear 
distinction between risk and uncertainty and find ways to reduce part of this unknown. 
However, only Knight sets a clear ontological limit in the attempt to substitute risk for 
uncertainty.  
As pointed out by Shackle (1967), another key figure in evolutionary political economy, 
‘uncertainty was the new strand placed gleamingly in the skein of economic ideas in the 1930s” 
(p. 6). Keynes provided a simple definition of uncertainty in a famous article published in the 
Quarterly Journal of Economics: “a matter for which there is no scientific basis on which to 
form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know” (1937, pp. 213–214).7 Best   
underlines that both Knight and Keynes ‘saw economic decision making as based on 
conventional rather than perfectly rational thinking’ (p. 364). Keynes’ solution to face radical 
uncertainty is indeed based on the role played by social conventions in the ‘intersubjective 
nature of economic activity’ (Best, 2008, p. 364).8 In contrast, Knight distinguishes between 
three situations – risk, uncertainty, and true uncertainty – that not only gives us a detailed 
spectrum of the different forms of risk and uncertainty, but also attributes to knowledge the 
ability to overcome situations of so-called true uncertainty. With an emphasis on expert 
judgement, he sees no epistemic limit in the ability to face such situations (see Table 1). 
However, as we will see below, Knight identifies a strong ontological limit in the ability of 
anticipating the future when this resembles situations of true uncertainty.  
In Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, Knight (1921) explores how profit is generated in 
different situations of ‘partial knowledge’ (p. 199), developing various categories to secure 
‘better knowledge of and control over the future’ (p. 260). These categories are represented in 
his well-known triptych: a priori probability, statistical probability and estimates of probability. 
A priori probability is used in a situation of entire rationality close to laboratory conditions, in 
which alternatives are homogeneously classified. However, he points out that ‘we hardly find 
in practice really homogeneous classifications ‘in the sense in which mathematical probability 
implies, as in the case of successive throws of a perfect die’ (p. 246). For its part, statistical 
probability aims at objectifying a more uncertain situation, yet still considered by Knight to be 
a risk. It differs from a priori probability according to ‘the accuracy of classification of the 
instances grouped together’ (p. 217), i.e. heterogeneity versus homogeneity. Indeed, statistical 
probability can only be computed empirically, and not, as a priori probability, on general 
principles (p. 224). The next level of this triptych – estimates of probability – is an uncertainty, 
in which there is ‘no valid basis of any kind for classifying instances’ (p. 225). Yet, according 
to Knight, such situations can still be managed and transformed into statistical probabilities 
with the help of estimates of probability. It requires estimating ‘the given factors in a situation 
and also estimate the probability that any particular consequence will follow from any of them 
if present in the degree assumed’ (p. 214). Therefore, uncertainty describes situations in which 
complexity is still out of our frame of reference. Transforming undefined uncertainty into 
manageable risk then depends on quantitative tools and categorizations.  
The core of the analysis driving towards an ontological limit lies in the difference that 
Knight draws between uncertainty and true uncertainty: ‘that higher form of uncertainty not 
susceptible to measurement and hence to elimination’ (p. 232). The entrepreneur, according to 
Knight, often deals with such situations of true uncertainty that call off quantitative reasoning 
and require ‘judgment’, ‘common sense’, or ‘intuition’ (p. 211). Knight thus sets an ontological 
limit in the substitution of risk for uncertainty, while recognizing the ability of expert judgment 
to reduce at least part of it. Against this background, he distinguishes between individuals facing 
true uncertainty and those having the skills to predict better than others (p. 241). In a nutshell, 
Knight considers that the future cannot always be dealt quantitatively, but that expert judgement 
can compensate for that. He sees such knowledge in the hands of smart entrepreneurs and 
consultants, thus able to overcome the epistemic limit to substitute risk for uncertainty.9  
  
Pluralization of science: earth as the limit 
We have seen so far that most theories examining risk and uncertainty see no ontological and/or 
epistemic limit in the substitution of risk for uncertainty. We now probe our second argument 
according to which both the ontological and epistemic limits exist in the substitution of risk for 
uncertainty (see Table 1). This second argument draws on the assumption that accounting for 
the uncertainty of the future depends on what we call here a pluralization of science, which 
describes knowledge production processes aimed at overcoming disciplinary boundaries and 
better including lay and expert knowledge. 
We are not short of studies that point out the co-production of science and society, while 
acknowledging the power of expertise as a mean of control over the material world (Jasanoff, 
2004; Latour, 1993; Pestre, 2013). As Jasanoff suggests (2004, p. 3), scientific knowledge is 
embedded in ‘social practices, identities, norms, conventions, discourses, instruments and 
institutions’. Under the apparent technicality of the subject and the neutrality of science, 
decisions of experts escape democratic debate although they engage our common future. In the 
same vein, Latour (2017) recently underlined in the context of the twin globalization and 
ecological crisis the importance of ‘multiplying points of view (…) taking into account a greater 
number of beings, cultures, phenomena, organisms and people’ (p. 23, our translation). Callon 
and his co-authors (2001, p. 36) view in ‘hybrid for a’ a device to address scientific 
controversies in exploratory spaces open to heterogonous groups, knowledge and experiences. 
These hybrid fora challenge both knowledge production captured by experts, as well as 
scientific representation captured by elected politicians. Graz and Hauert (2019) developed the 
concept of ‘pluralization of knowledge’ that reflects such a need ‘to reach out to a broader pool 
on an ad-hoc basis’ in order to ‘look for cognitive resources on a much more heterogeneous 
basis’ (pp. 15-16). In contrast to Callon and his co-authors focused on regime of controversies, 
they provide ‘insights for an in-depth understanding of the co-production of socio-technical 
knowledge’ (Graz & Hauert, 2019, p. 10). In the following analysis, we draw from these 
accounts to examine how the pluralization of science is a promising avenue to cope with limits 
in substituting risk for uncertainty at both ontological and epistemic levels of analysis. We start 
with the need to overcome boundaries of disciplinary knowledge and follow with the need to 
better include lay and expert knowledge.  
The first aspect of pluralization of science relates to interdisciplinarity. According to 
Miller (2010, p. 1), knowledge production has become ‘less effective due to disciplinary 
fragmentation’. Similarly, Epstein (2019) underlines the disadvantages of specialization in 
addressing wicked environment problems where not all information is available to make a 
decision. This mostly reflects a lack of interdisciplinarity related to the outcome of individual 
skills in different fields. However, a pluralization of science depends on a form of 
interdisciplinarity that also relies on the various experiences of a broader range of stakeholders. 
From this view, it is mainly a collective process. It is in this context for instance that Cashore 
and Bernstein (2019) are calling for a scholarly ‘Marshal Plan’ that would include many fields 
of critical social sciences. They underline that such a collaboration would be of particular help 
to address the challenges posed by climate change and ongoing massive species extinctions (p. 
1). The Delphi method discussed above had similar inputs regarding interdisciplinarity and 
collective decision-making, by indicating that ‘several heads are better than one in making 
subjective conjectures about the future’ (Weaver, 1971, p. 268). Yet, this method still 
recognizes the superior role of specialized knowledge seen as able to ‘make conjectures based 
upon rational judgement rather than merely guessing’ (p. 268). It is worth noting that Haas 
(2017) – well known for his concept of epistemic communities – still considers today that the 
knowledge produced within the confines of a discipline bears the highest expectations: ‘panels 
with expertise based on disciplinary credentials proved more influential than those with more 
open-ended experts from civil society’ (p. 62).  
In addition to embracing many disciplinary fields, a pluralization of science also builds 
on the ability to better connect lay and expert knowledge. In this sense, it reflects a form of 
civic science, which Bäckstrand (2003, p. 25) describes as ‘enhancing public understanding of 
science, increasing citizen participation, diversifying representation in, and promoting 
democratization of science’. A good case in point regarding such pluralization is the study of 
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1994) on the democratization of knowledge required for a proper 
understanding of songbirds’ contribution to nature – what they call a ‘postnormal science’. Such 
postnormal science requires more than one discipline in the analysis of a complex phenomenon, 
and the extension of the knowledge production process to lay actors concerned by the issue at 
stake. From a different perspective, de Sousa Santos (2018) recently made a comprehensive 
critique of the ‘epistemologies of the North’ valuing expert and scientific knowledge and 
emphasized the need for a shift towards ‘epistemologies of the South’ valuing plural knowledge 
based on a move from ‘knowing-about’ to ‘knowing-with’. 
As a way of illustration in the field of global environmental governance, we can draw 
on a growing number of international initiatives and platforms that aim at including such 
diversity of knowledge within their knowledge production processes. The Intergovernmental 
Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) is a good case in 
point.10 The IPBES recently claimed to include a larger range of actors for efficient biodiversity 
and ecosystem services assessment and related valuation (Dunkley et al., 2018; Vadrot, 2014). 
Its reports recognize both the diversity of nature’s values on the one hand – including non-
quantitative forms of valuation – and the plurality of forms of knowledge on the other – 
including ‘governments, civil society organizations, and indigenous people and local 
communities’ (IPBES, 2018, p. 30). Yet, a gap remains between the discourse (or even the will), 
and the practice of including a more heterogenous basis of knowledge into mainstream science. 
This concerns both the question of interdisciplinarity and the ability to take indigenous and 
local knowledge aboard (Hughes & Vadrot, 2019; it also applies for the politics of natural 
disasters and the involvement and production of knowledge of the United Nations Office for 
Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), see: Revet, 2018). Studies point out that the IPBES failed 
‘to find ways of dealing with contrasting rationalists, diverging ontologies and different criteria 
for knowledge validation” (Dunkley et al., 2018, p. 794). Brand and Vadrot (2013) draw on  the 
concept of epistemic selectivity to explain such a phenomenon of ‘knowledge–power nexus’ 
where political institutions privilege particular forms of knowledge over others. From such 
perspective, some consider that the IPBES needs ‘to open up procedures and practices of 
participation and inclusion in order to accommodate pluralism, contestation and 
incommensurable perspectives and knowledge systems’ (Díaz-Reviriego et al., 2019, p. 457). 
For instance, while the United States advocated a so-called science-driven process focused on 
ecosystem services, valuation and quantification; Bolivia was firmly opposed to ‘the ecosystem 
framing and sought greater plurality of worldviews represented’ (Hughes & Vadrot, 2019, p. 
30). In the domain of climate diplomacy, Belfer (2019) and colleagues also showed that the 
actual involvement of indigenous peoples remained limited. Ultimately, such a difficulty of 
combining different and sometimes incommensurable modes of knowledge also relates to 
actors’ different understandings of risk and uncertainty, which may subsequently shape their 
policy preferences.  
Finally, a pluralization of science that emphasizes both ontological and epistemic limits 
in subsisting risk for uncertainty sheds light on the incompleteness of knowledge. We just do 
not know whether all the necessary knowledge is included, beat across existing scientific 
disciplines or across lay and expert knowledge. Overall, many challenges remain regarding a 
proper pluralization of science, as well as a recognition of the ontological and epistemic limits 
in the substitution of risk for uncertainty. 
 
Conclusion 
In a context of global, epochal and complex changes, this article has examined the ability to 
anticipate an uncertain future, with insights from global environmental governance and 
opposing responses to the relations between the economy, nature and society. It contends that 
a distinction must be made between risk and uncertainty, as well as between ontological and 
epistemic levels of analysis, and therefore set or not set ontological and/or epistemic limits in 
substituting risk for uncertainty. From this assumption, the analysis has shown, first, that most 
theories see no ontological and/or epistemic limit in the substitution of risk for uncertainty; 
second, that the pluralization of science is a more promising avenue to cope with limits in 
substituting risk for uncertainty. Mainstream economics sees neither ontological nor epistemic 
limit in substituting risk for uncertainty. Studies in heterodox international political economy 
and sociology, for their part, question such lack of epistemic limits, while reproducing somehow 
a ‘no limit ontology’ in the range of phenomena subject to their critique. We have furthermore 
drawn on Knight’s concept of true uncertainty to suggest that, from an evolutionary political 
economy perspective, there are ontological limits in the substitution of risk for uncertainty. Yet, 
such an approach confers on expert judgement the ability to overcome the epistemic limit. The 
pluralization of science shows that accounting for the uncertainty of the future depends on 
knowledge production processes better able to overcome disciplinary boundaries and include 
lay and expert knowledge. However, many challenges remain for a proper application of a 
pluralization of science, one of them being the hegemony of a particular form of knowledge 
over others. Therefore, this article suggests that international political economy scholars would 
be well informed to consider the question of limits as well as the nature of such limits when 
analyzing how uncertainty is reduced. 
This ultimately leads to take the question of the incompleteness of knowledge seriously, 
as both our individual and collective capacities to anticipate the future by substituting risk for 
uncertainty are limited. A first avenue for future research concerns the burgeoning studies on 
resilience. This question of limits may clarify existing debates on the use of the concept of 
resilience to appraise the ability of societies to face unexpected events and on how such policies 
are likely to take power issues onboard. While some scholars take a critical stance on the overall 
relevance of the concept viewed as a product of contemporary neoliberalism (Bourbeau, 2018; 
Felli, 2016; Phelan et al., 2013; Walker & Cooper, 2011), others argue that it provides 
interesting insights to reflect on our limits to anticipate the future. According to Holling (1973), 
a pioneer on ecological resilience, this may even be close to what we describe here as 
pluralization of science: a resilience approach ‘would emphasize the need to keep options open, 
(…)  heterogeneity [and] the recognition of our ignorance’ (p. 21).  
A second course of future analysis relates to research undertaken under the umbrella of 
future studies – particularly relevant when analyzing the knowledge used to govern 
environmental futures (Granjou et al., 2017). For instance, scholarship on anticipatory action 
and governance underline the political and contested nature of uncertainty reduction strategies, 
albeit without explicitly distinguishing between ontological and epistemic dimensions, let alone 
the existence of intrinsic limits in such exercises (Aykut et al., 2019; Guston, 2014). Similarly, 
Anderson (2010) deconstructs the styles, practices and logics through which the future is 
disclosed, yet without taking into account the ontological limits that face what he sees as a 
proliferation of anticipatory action. Engaging the resilience and anticipatory action and 
governance literature could help specifying how such policies are justified, legitimized, and 
contested beyond grand narratives. 
Finally, there is ample space for generalizing the argument made on the pluralization of 
science. A thorny question in this regard is the limits that the advocates of ‘citizens science’ 
could face in the demand to further extend the scope of what we call here the pluralization of 
science (Irwin, 1995; McKinley et al., 2017). Moreover, globalizing the pluralization of science 
brings to mind the decolonial turn in international relations (Mantz, 2019; Seth, 2011). Yet, it 
also raises broader and, arguably, more urgent concerns, as it is less a matter of disciplinary 
identity than how to face the global ecological crisis within the constraints of a just transition 
(Morena et al., 2019). This question is particularly urgent in the context of the Covid-19 crisis 
and its both global and local socioeconomic and political consequences. International political 
economy scholars have here a fertile ground for research on how unexpected events are 
disrupting the present and creating the future – while taking into account the question of limits 
when analyzing how the future may be anticipated. Arguably, exiting such crises cannot be 
done without better linking up with the ‘degrowth movement’. Indeed, degrowth first calls for 
a greater democratization of decision-making processes as it applies a pluralization of science 
for many other teleological positions and other utopias than environmental sustainability, such 
as issues of class, race and gender (Parrique, 2020). In addition, degrowth makes particular 
emphasis on the question of limits, and as Kallis (2019, p. 1) recently underlined, “Western 
culture is infatuated with the dream of overcoming limits”.  
  
Notes  
1. We are well aware that theories discussed in this article do not exhaust accounts on risk and 
uncertainty in social sciences. They only account for what we see as the most relevant 
interdisciplinary and pluralist corpus for the puzzle of risk and uncertainty in IPE debates.  
2. Insurance losses from natural disasters were estimated at 219 billions of US dollars between 
2017 and 2018, ‘the highest-ever for a two-year period’ (Swiss Re Institute, 2019). 
3. We are aware that debates on the distinction between mainstream and heterodox has fed much 
debates without necessary much clarity about the criteria defining one or the other (Jo et al., 
2018). It includes at its core neoclassical orthodoxy, but also extends to behavioral economics 
and with some variations, a number of other schools of thought (for further details, see: Dobusch 
& Kapeller, 2012). 
4. Costanza and his colleagues who did the first global monetary assessment of nature’s value used 
a discount rate of 5% in order to convert stock values into annual flows. Such a rate of 
conversion was crucial to reach the final figure of 33 trillion of US dollars for the annual services 
provided by ecosystem for human beings. This is slightly more than Nordhaus’ average 4.3% 
used in his modelling, and clearly more than Stern (2006) in his review of the economics of 
climate change, using a discount rate of 1%. 
5. In the same vein, Ericson (2005, p. 660) points out that “Beck should have called it the uncertain 
society because his focus is on potential and actual scientific and technological disasters that 
have proven unpredictable and entail immeasurable human suffering”. 
6. See the forthcoming special issue of the Cambridge Journal of Economics provisionally entitled 
‘Keynes’ Treatise on Probability and Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit After 100 Years’ 
(Editors: Phil Faulkner, Alberto Feduzi, C.R. McCann, Jr, Jochen Runde). 
7. The whole quote is the following: ‘By “uncertain” knowledge [...] I do not mean merely to 
distinguish what is known for certain from what is only probable. The game of roulette is not 
subject, in this sense, to uncertainty; nor is the prospect of a Victory bond being drawn. Or, 
again, the expectation of life is only slightly uncertain. Even the weather is only moderately 
uncertain. The sense in which 1am using the term is that in which the prospect of a European 
war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the 
obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private wealth-owners in the social system 
in 1970. About these matters, there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable 
probability whatever. We simply do not know” (J. M. Keynes, 1937, pp. 213–214). 
8. To some degree, he could even be related to the heterodox approaches in international political 
economy and sociology seen above, since no ontological limits seem likely to arise in such 
transformation of uncertainty into risk.  
9. John R. Commons’ concept of ‘futurity’ would also deserve further analysis in the wake of his 
observations that ‘man lives in the future but acts in the present’ (1934, p. 58). Basically, 
Commons sees no epistemic limit if rights – or ‘the collective working rules of society’ – are 
properly negotiated between the parties concerned to provide a ‘security of expectation’. The 
recent best-seller co-authored by Mervyn King, former Governor of the Bank of England, 
reaches somehow similar conclusions in considering that eventually creative business, political 
and personal strategies are better than number to cope with radical uncertainty (Kay & King, 
2020). 
10. The official aim of the IPBES is to provide Governments, the private sector, and civil society 
with scientifically credible and independent up-to-date assessments of available knowledge to 
make informed decisions at the local, regional and international levels. 
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